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Abstract 
The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on the 25th of May 
1963 gave hope that African countries would unite in eradicating colonialism 
as well as facilitating economic and social development. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution in 1993 ensured that an institutional structure for the maintenance 
of peace and security existed on the continent. However, the OAU largely failed 
to address the challenges that the continent faced and this led to calls for the 
OAU’s transmutation into the African Union (AU). The establishment of 
the AU on the 9th of July 2002 was thus greeted with high levels of optimism 
and euphoria, and the expectation that the continental body would now fully 
tackle the problems on the continent. An important development was the 
formation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the 25th of May 2004, 
as main component of the architecture through which peace and security 
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in Africa were hopefully going to be achieved. This development presented 
an opportunity for the further institutionalisation of Pan-African ideals, 
with the hope that Africa would forge even closer unity. However, at present, the 
AU PSC continues to experience severe challenges, some of them inherent in 
the organisational structure of the continental body while some are externally 
induced. Some of these limitations include lack of unity of purpose as well as 
of political will among member states to deal with the conflicts bedevilling the 
African continent – as evidenced by developments during the Arab Spring. 
What transpired in Libya in 2011 was a clear indication of the slow evolution 
of AU ideals, a situation which was further compounded by the intervention 
and interference by some members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) and the pretext of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’.
Introduction
The inauguration of the OAU on the 25th of May 1963 carried hopes and 
aspirations of Africa’s people for an independent, peaceful and prosperous 
continent. It represented the genesis and institutionalisation of Pan-African 
ideals. Although the establishment of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 at the Cairo Summit 
symbolised the existence of an institutional structure for the maintenance of 
peace and security on the continent, the OAU failed dismally in its efforts to 
eradicate conflicts across the continent. Some of the crucial factors which led to 
the OAU’s failure to bring peace across the continent included such provisions 
within its Charter as Articles 2(c) and 3(c) which emphasised non-interference 
in internal affairs of member states, an approach which translated into non-
action during periods of turmoil. The Charter contained the provision to defend 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states, an idea 
which was later translated into the norm of non-intervention. Key organs of the 
OAU, which included the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, could only intervene in a conflict situation if invited by the parties 
involved (Makinda and Okumu 2008). Regrettably, due to religious adherence 
to this doctrine of non-intervention, the OAU became a silent observer to the 
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atrocities committed by some of its member states. The conflict situation which 
continued to prevail across many parts of Africa was typified by dereliction 
of responsibility by the continent’s collective leadership. Africa witnessed 
unprecedented violence during the same decade that the OAU established the 
mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. As a result, the need arose 
among African leaders to forge even closer unity on the continent and adopt a 
project of regional integration. The AU project was then born in Sirte, Libya, 
in 1999. The AU’s Constitutive Act was subsequently signed in Lomé, Togo, on 
11 July 2000 (Gebrewold 2010). The official inauguration took place in July 2002 
in Durban, South Africa.  
The emergence of the AU was received with much excitement. There were also 
great expectations of the AU’s proposals for innovations which were anticipated 
to take it beyond the limited achievements of its predecessor, the OAU. In the 
AU’s rather complex institutional framework, there was the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) which was officially launched on the 25th of May 2004. As 
articulated in its founding Protocol, the AU PSC’s primary objective is to promote 
peace, security and stability in Africa in order to guarantee the protection and 
preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and the 
environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable 
development. The leading light of the continental security architecture was, and 
remains, the aspiration for a home-grown (African) approach to finding lasting 
methods of conflict prevention, and peace and security promotion in a continent 
riddled by conflicts (Engel and Porto 2010). That was embodied in the concept 
of ‘African solutions to African problems’. However, the recent developments 
raise questions regarding the extent to which the AU has lived up to expectations. 
The developments in Libya in 2011 point to institutional weaknesses similar to 
those which beset the OAU, and this raises doubts as to the continental body’s 
potential to achieve the envisaged ‘African solutions to African problems’ amid 
indications of being undermined by various other factors and forces. In the case 
of Libya, the United States of America (US), Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, with the support of the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey, all under 
the banner of NATO, ‘abused’ the UN provisions and undermined the AU’s 
ambitious efforts at finding an amicable and lasting solution to the Libyan crisis.
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As highlighted by the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his message 
during the ceremony to officially launch the PSC, the establishment of the PSC 
meant that the AU had crossed yet another significant threshold in its quest 
to promote lasting peace and stability, strengthen democratic institutions and 
support sustainable development throughout Africa. Annan added that the 
AU PSC was a potentially powerful tool for the prevention, management and 
resolution of violent conflict and that the wise counsel and vigorous diplomacy 
of the AU members was going to be crucial in guiding the continent through 
the challenges of instability and economic stagnation to the calmer situations 
of peace and development. However, the question remains whether the PSC has 
evolved into a formidable and effective structure capable of eradicating conflicts 
on the African continent.
This article, therefore, examines how the AU, through the PSC, handled the 
Libyan crisis in its (the AU’s) quest to effectively manage and promote peace 
and security. This comes against the backdrop of perpetual failure to eradicate 
numerous other conflicts which continue to rage across the continent. However, it 
appears a bit too early to pass a definitive judgment on the AU’s peace operations 
since the paradigm shift in attitudes that it is attempting to bring about and the 
institutions that it has developed to do so, are at times undermined by other 
factors and, therefore, the relatively new security architecture might need to be 
given the opportunity to work.
Democracy and governance issues in Libya: The genesis of 
the uprising
For the most part, Arab countries had managed to stay away from the turmoil that 
has been affecting most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Hassouna 2001). However, 
with the passage of time, an unexpected wave of popular protests, which later 
became known as the ‘Arab Spring’, broke out in North Africa towards the end 
of 2010. The principal causes of the uprisings, just as in other countries on the 
continent, included decades-long dictatorships, government corruption, and 
lack of civil and political rights, among other issues. The situation where some 
sections of the people within some countries are oppressed and some leaders fail 
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to respect the fundamental human rights set forth by the AU’s Human Rights 
Charter, has always had high chances of triggering protests. Starting with the 
fall of the Presidents of Tunisia and Egypt as a result of peaceful protests, the 
wave spread to Libya where it subsequently turned violent. The revolt against 
Gaddafi’s regime started as a wave of protests, especially in Benghazi in the 
eastern part of Libya around mid-February 2011, and later spread across the 
country. However, the protests escalated/degenerated into civil war across 
the country after government troops loyal to Gaddafi descended heavily on 
demonstrators and fired on them. 
The history of Libya has always been controversial if compared with Western 
models of governance and democracy. Assessing Gaddafi’s rule over 42 years from 
the time he assumed power in a coup in 1969 reveals many appalling deficiencies 
in governance and democracy. The Gaddafi regime lacked transparency and 
had an arbitrary nature of policy making. The system of governance also had 
formidable and effective organs of coercion which managed to overcome a 
multiplicity of challenges, creating a perceivably stable, but not democratic 
society (Martinez 2007). Gaddafi’s heavy-handed approach in political and 
governance issues over the four decades of political marginalisation and 
oppression antagonised quite a sizeable number of Libyans. Although Gaddafi 
did fairly well in terms of socio-economic development, his reign was renowned 
for repression of political dissent as well as the formation of a personality cult 
around Gaddafi as the enlightened ‘Leader and Guide’ of the revolution (Koko 
and Bakwesegha-Osula 2011). It was this tendency to squash dissent which the 
regime adopted when the protests broke out. The seemingly peaceful protests 
which started in Benghazi around mid-February 2011 turned violent within a 
week. This was partly because of the Gaddafi regime’s crackdown on protesters 
and partly because an armed opposition group, the Transitional National 
Council (TNC), was also quickly established (Williams 2011). As if to lend 
credence to the purported assumption that the uprising was pre-meditated, the 
TNC established full and operational units under its command within a very 
short period of time. Although the opposition forces enjoyed rapid success 
during the beginning of the armed protests, the Gaddafi regime later tipped the 
balance of power back in their favour as they unleashed heavy attacks in order to 
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destroy the rebellion’s epicentre in Benghazi. It was against this background that 
the crisis assumed full-scale armed conflict, marking the genesis of the Libyan 
debacle which later attracted international attention, divided the AU and shook 
its fragile new foundations of democracy and conflict prevention.
The AU’s role and involvement in the Libyan conflict
In most cases, the ambitions of the AU on the continent are clearly evident in the 
quest for peace, and the determination to strive for peace seems sincere (Møller 
2009). It is observable that the AU does not simply watch without doing anything 
as deadly events unfold and plague countries on the African continent. In the case 
of Libya, there was evidence of positive AU hands-on involvement right from the 
start and it (the AU) undertook a number of initiatives aimed at bringing peace 
to the country. When the conflict exploded in Libya, the AU intrinsically took 
the responsibility to engage all the different stakeholders in Libya with the hope 
of finding an amicable solution to the crisis. One of the AU PSC’s first and very 
commendable initiatives was the creation, on the 10th of March 2011, of an AU 
High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya which was tasked to find means to stop 
the escalation of the Libyan crisis. The Committee was mandated to pay special 
attention to the troubled state with a view to engaging all key stakeholders 
in the quest to mediate a solution to the crisis. The idea was informed by 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni who was categorical during one of the AU 
meetings that the Libyan crisis was an African problem and therefore called for 
an African solution with the assistance of the wider international community 
(Museveni 2011).Working with the AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, 
five countries represented by their respective presidents were appointed to this 
Ad Hoc Committee: South Africa (Jacob Zuma), Mauritania (Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz), Mali (then under Amadou Toumani Toure), Congo Brazzavile 
(Denis Sassou Nguesso) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni).
In pursuit of noble intentions meant to bring peace to Libya, the AU, in 
conjunction with the Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, came up with an AU roadmap 
to peace which sought to bring all the stakeholders around the table for purposes 
of working out modalities to implement a five-point plan whose objectives were: 
protection of civilians and the cessation of hostilities; provision of humanitarian 
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assistance to affected populations; the initiation of political dialogue among the 
Libyan parties in order to reach an agreement for implementing modalities for 
ending the crisis; establishment and management of an inclusive transitional 
period; and the adoption and implementation of political reforms necessary 
to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people. In all fairness, the AU roadmap 
to peace in Libya was a genuine attempt at conflict resolution and not merely 
an attempt to shore up Gaddafi’s appearance of legitimacy. In pursuit of these 
objectives, several other AU PSC meetings were held. Concerns were raised about 
the military intervention in Libya by some countries under the banner of NATO. 
Besides arranging for AU foreign ministers to meet with representatives of all 
the countries bordering Libya in order to discuss the regional implications of 
the conflict as well as map out strategies for regional stability, the AU mediation 
panel (the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee) also issued statements rejecting all 
forms of military intervention in Libya.
Besides expressing deep concern at the dangerous precedent that was being set by 
the lop-sided interpretations of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 
1970 and 1973, the AU Summit directed the PSC to diligently consider 
authorising the immediate deployment of an AU Observer Mission to monitor 
developments on the ground and facilitate the subsequent establishment of a 
bigger international mission which was supposed to involve the UN, the League 
of Arab States, the AU and any other relevant organisations. The AU Summit 
also urged member states to avail manpower, and financial and logistical 
support for the early and efficient deployment of the envisaged mission. Besides 
urging all the stakeholders in Libya to cooperate with the AU, the Summit also 
requested the African Group in New York and African members of the UNSC to 
take the initiative and call for a UNSC meeting to re-assess the implementation 
of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 which were apparently undermining the 
AU efforts, and causing the continental organisation to feel marginalised in the 
management of issues of an African country.
On behalf of the AU, South African President Jacob Zuma undertook two visits 
in two weeks during the month of June 2011 to meet and negotiate with Gaddafi 
(Massoni 2011). The NATO forces’ disregard of the calls by the AU to halt 
the bombardment clearly undermined the continental body’s efforts to bring 
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peace to Libya. The intention to undermine the AU was clearly demonstrated 
by the following. The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee, in conformity with 
resolution 1973 of the UNSC, requested on the 19th of March 2011 (after meeting 
in Mauritania) permission for the flight carrying its delegation to enter Libya on 
20 March 2011 for purposes of fulfilling its (the Ad Hoc Committee’s) mandate, 
but was initially denied permission notwithstanding the fact that both parties in 
the Libyan conflict had agreed to the proposal for dialogue (Bennis 2011; Mbeki 
2011b). However, it was only after persisting that the AU Ad Hoc Committee 
was eventually allowed to fly into Libya during the beginning of April 2011 for 
consultations with all the stakeholders in the country. In the African spirit of 
brotherhood, Gaddafi accepted the AU roadmap to a political solution of the 
crisis. Besides consulting with the US and NATO to cease bombings so that the 
ceasefire agreement could be given a chance, the Ad Hoc Committee also flew to 
Benghazi, the bedrock of opposition to Gaddafi’s rule, to consult and sell the AU 
roadmap to peace. However, the AU effort failed when the (then) rebels rejected 
the proposed roadmap to peace, arguing that the offer was a political manoeuvre 
by the AU. Given Gaddafi’s ties with some African countries ever since he 
abandoned Pan-Arab ideology in favour of Pan-African ideology, and the fact 
that he assisted some of the African countries in various ways (Sammut 2009), 
the AU was viewed as a tool or running project of his (Gaddafi’s) ambitions and 
not as a potential genuine/honest broker in the crisis. It was deeply believed in 
the eastern parts of Libya that African leaders were determined to help Gaddafi 
to cling on to power (Murphy 2011). As a result of the scepticism about the 
neutrality of the AU, the (then) rebels rejected the proposed roadmap, insisting 
that they were not going to accept any plan that fell short of Gaddafi’s departure. 
This further complicated and stalled the AU efforts.
Additionally, the AU issued statements clearly detailing its intention to organise 
a resource mobilisation conference to cater for the emerging problems in 
Libya as well as to meet with the Arab League and the UN to strategise ways to 
find an early resolution of the conflict. In the meantime, the AU Commission 
Chairperson, Jean Ping, held several meetings with some officials from European 
countries, highlighting the common African position on Libya as evidenced 
by the consensus on the five-point plan that made up the roadmap, seeking 
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their backing for the AU roadmap for resolving the Libyan crisis. Generally, 
the AU had the commitment to fulfil its mission to restore peace in Libya in 
spite of debilitating developments. Promising to act in compliance with the UN 
Resolution, the AU made it public that it was not going to spare any effort in 
facilitating a peaceful solution which was intended to duly consider the legitimate 
aspirations of the Libyan people. Notwithstanding the ingenuity as well as the 
efficacy of the AU roadmap, the NATO forces which participated in the Libyan 
campaign disregarded the peace plan and chose to undermine the AU.
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970  
and 1973
From its inception, the UN has always been striving to maintain peace in the 
world. As highlighted in its founding statutes, it is also one of the UN’s roles to 
ensure that conflicts are peacefully settled before resorting to the use of force. 
‘Peaceful means’ implies the use of approaches such as negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration, among other nonviolent methods. However, 
what transpired in Libya demonstrated undue influence and unwarranted and 
unjustified intervention since other peaceful means were never considered. 
Instead of taking a cue from the AU roadmap to peace in Libya, the UN, under 
the influence of mainly the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and France, supported 
by several other NATO members, decided to heed the call by the Council of the 
Arab League for the imposition of a no-fly zone. The call by the Council of the 
Arab League provided the much needed political cover for the much criticised 
military intervention. Besides the intervention being a complete violation of the 
‘letter and spirit’ of the UNSC resolutions, it greatly undermined the efforts of 
the AU which is one of the UN’s key pillars to support the furtherance of the 
objective to maintain or restore peace in the event of conflict. The AU’s efforts 
to restore peace in Libya were seriously undermined by the intervention of the 
NATO forces.
The UN’s actions appeared to have been premeditated and influenced by ulterior 
motives of some member states that either had a vendetta with Libya or the 
then President Gaddafi, or simply chose to undermine the AU efforts. Drawing 
parallels with the sequence of events during the Gulf crisis, developments in 
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Libya smack of a deliberate but veiled agenda to take advantage of the uprising 
in Libya and undermine the AU’s evolving strategic capacity. Following the 
initial disturbances in Libya which started in Benghazi on February 16, the 
UNSC responded by adopting Resolution 1970 which imposed travel bans on 
senior officials of the Gaddafi regime, froze Libyan leaders’ personal asserts, 
and instituted an arms embargo (Francois 2011). In pursuit of the objective to 
maintain peace and security, Resolution 1970 was quite in order as it sought to 
pressure Gaddafi to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the rebels. However, it 
is the manner in which the subsequent UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted and 
implemented which stirred controversy and ultimately undermined the AU’s 
approach to the Libyan crisis. In complete contrast with what happened during 
the Gulf crisis, UNSC Resolution 1970 (which was passed on 25 February 2011) 
had no deadline for implementation. That notwithstanding, passing Resolution 
1973 on 17 March 2011, 20 days after Resolution 1970, raised many questions 
over the efficacy of measures adopted to resolve the crisis as it smacked of double 
standards and ulterior motives by some Western countries (Khawaja 2011). 
Military action was initiated without exhausting all other possible channels 
of peaceful resolution of the crisis. Even after passing resolution 1973 on the 
17th of March 2011, French forces started bombarding Libya one day later, on 
the 18th of March 2011. It was unlike the Gulf crisis where all possible measures 
for peaceful resolution of the crisis were exhausted. Despite the fact that the 
Gulf crisis posed a threat to international peace and security, Iraq was given a 
longer period of time to withdraw its forces before the international community 
resorted to military action. The first resolution (Resolution 678) was passed on 
29 November 1990 and Iraq had a deadline date of 15 January 1991 to withdraw 
its forces. This significant restraint was in conformity with the UN Charter’s 
Article 42 which stresses the use of force only as a last resort (Khawaja 2011).
Further evidence of the intention to undermine the AU clearly came from the 
statements by President Obama (US), the then President Sarkozy (France), 
and Prime Minister Cameron (UK) who declared in a joint letter published in 
the media on the 15th of April that they could not contemplate Libya’s future 
with Gaddafi in power. They further indicated in the same letter their hope for 
Libya’s future without Gaddafi, insisting that he (Gaddafi) ‘had to go for good’ 
(Mbeki 2011a). Additionally, the call for Gaddafi to leave the country and face 
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trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) only served to render a ceasefire 
impossible and to maximise the prospects of continued armed conflict since 
it emboldened Gaddafi’s resolve to remain in Libya and fight to the bitter end. 
These developments worked against the AU efforts to restore peace in Libya as 
the TNC gained courage from these statements to fight on.
The AU’s weaknesses: Induced or inherent?
The ambitions of the AU in its attempts to resolve conflicts on the African continent 
do not always bring about positive results. In most cases, the determination to 
strive to achieve its (the AU’s) objectives seems sincere (Møller 2009). Despite 
a robust peace and security design for the AU, the organisation appears to be 
handicapped by numerous factors and inherent structural deformities which 
hinder it from achieving its goals. Among some of the factors which tend to limit 
the AU’s effectiveness are the lack of unity of purpose among the member states, 
inaction on critical issues, ineffective resolutions, and external interference in 
the affairs of the African continent. These are discussed as follows:
Why did the AU roadmap fail?
Although there is very strong criticism of the role of some Western powers in 
Libya as they stand accused of undermining the approach of ‘African solutions 
to African problems’ – evidenced by the manner in which the AU’s roadmap 
for peace in Libya was undermined by the use of excessive force aimed at 
regime change, it can also be argued that the roadmap never had any prospects 
of achieving success (Nathan 2011). Although the AU was never afforded the 
opportunity to play a leading role in finding a solution to the Libyan debacle 
despite its effort to try and engage all the parties to the conflict (Ebrahim 2011), 
its approach (of preventive diplomacy) was no longer a viable option because 
the rebellion had already started. 
Lack of unity of purpose among AU member states
The lack of unity of purpose among African states is a fundamental problem that 
dates back to the colonial era. By then, the divisions resulted in the formation 
of blocs such as the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups. This led to 
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a general consensus that the initial formation of the OAU was a compromise. 
Such divisions manifested themselves again at the time of the transition to the 
AU. The gradual unity that the newly independent African countries favoured 
in 1963 is still preferred in the present day and, although it can be classified as 
pragmatic politics, it is a reflection of compromise politics that serves short-
term goals. African states have continued to favour compromise politics because 
of the emphasis on the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty that focuses on 
state rights without duties. 
AU member states are still not enthusiastic about devolving sovereignty to the 
continental organisation as a supranational body. In addition, this lack of unity 
has often been responsible for the perceived failure by the AU to attain a common 
position on critical issues. The AU roadmap to peace in Libya did not materialise 
because the continent was not united in the adoption of a common position 
to solve the Libyan crisis. In spite of Gaddafi’s well publicised largesse towards 
other African countries as well as other initiatives which included Libya’s regular 
15% contributions to the AU operational budget (Nolan 2011), his interference 
in the affairs of other African countries earned him few genuine friends among 
African leaders. Therefore, diverging views among African leaders regarding 
Gaddafi’s regime quickly translated into a lack of coherence within the African 
countries. It was against this context that the African member countries which 
participated in the UNSC proceedings leading to the passing of resolutions 
1970 and 1973 are considered to have let down the continent. Whereas there 
was not much of a problem with resolution 1970, it is the implementation of 
resolution 1973 which sparked much controversy. The three African countries 
that were serving as semi-permanent members of the UNSC at that time, viz 
South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon, supported resolution 1973 probably for 
different reasons and might not have been aware of the likely consequences. 
That notwithstanding, this development demonstrated a lack of strategic 
coordination between the AU Commission and these semi-permanent members 
of the UN insofar as protecting the AU’s position/interest was concerned. The 
AU ‘common position’ encapsulated in its roadmap to peace, had already been 
crafted by the time the UNSC voting took place (Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula 
2012). Additionally, South Africa’s vote in support of resolution 1973 invited 
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the ire and criticism of other African countries since the continent expected the 
political and economic giant in Africa to play an effective role in articulating and 
asserting Pan-African values. Zuma, representing South Africa and being the 
leader of the five-member AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, had the 
opportunity to articulate the African common position on the matter. Voting 
for the UNSC resolution 1973 was contrary to what the AU PSC had agreed 
(Museveni 2011). Although the damage was irreparably done, Zuma tried to 
defend South Africa’s stance by accusing some NATO members of overriding 
the purpose of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973, which apparently did not 
authorise implementation of a regime change agenda, but was supposed to be 
limited solely to the protection of civilians (Massoni 2011). Zuma’s criticism of 
the NATO air strikes, which he later considered to have been against the ‘letter 
and spirit’ of the UNSC, came a bit too late and was of no consequence as discord 
and disunity among African countries had perceptibly taken root already.
Lack of unity of purpose and patterns of enmity among African countries also 
became evident as the Libyan crisis unfolded. This happened notwithstanding 
the AU’s declaratory commitment to a culture which precludes disunity and in 
particular behaviour that privileges armed conflict (Vreÿ 2008). About three 
months after the crisis erupted, cracks which had emerged within the AU started 
widening. By June 2011, as a sign of protesting against Gaddafi’s approach to the 
Libyan crisis, Liberia suspended all diplomatic relations with the Libyan regime 
as a way to gradually isolate Gaddafi. With the passage of time, Gambia, Senegal 
and Mauritania started recognising the TNC, a move which was directly contrary 
to the AU principles (Massoni 2011). As events unfolded, sharp divisions among 
AU members continued. As the conflict intensified and as Gaddafi became 
less and less vocal, his public appearances were drastically reduced and his 
whereabouts unknown, and Botswana as well as one of the African powerhouses, 
Nigeria, were quickly added to the list of African countries that recognised the 
TNC as the bona fide government of Libya (Kasasira 2011). Interestingly, the 
situation was the opposite in Zimbabwe where Mugabe refused to recognise the 
TNC even well after the death of Gaddafi. The Libyan Ambassador to Zimbabwe, 
who hoisted the TNC flag at the Libyan embassy in Zimbabwe during the peak 
of the crisis, was expelled from Zimbabwe as the government issued a 48-hour 
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ultimatum for the Ambassador to leave the country because he had violated 
the perceivably ‘common position’ of the AU by then. These divisions across 
the continent shook the AU’s new and fragile foundations designed to promote 
democracy and the prevention of conflict (Sturman 2012).
The AU itself later blundered in the manner it handled the Libyan conflict. The 
AU decision to recognise the TNC was in complete violation of its working 
ethics as an institution. Initially, the AU was not really in support of international 
opinion, opting for an isolated and ambivalent view of events in Libya. With so 
much discord, which was characterised by some African countries supporting 
the TNC while others either remained undecided or opted to openly support 
the Gaddafi regime, the demise of the AU’s common position on the Libyan 
conflict and the futility of opposing the TNC became glaringly evident and 
inevitable. Although the AU PSC, during its meeting on 26 August 2011, as well 
as the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee meeting, made it conditional to recognise 
the TNC only after the creation of an all-inclusive transitional government, the 
TNC was subsequently recognised before the formation of any government, even 
during the post-Gaddafi era. Such statements were viewed as veiled acceptance 
of the TNC. This development threatened the AU’s normative framework 
which governs unconstitutional changes of governments. There is no doubt 
that the toppling of Gaddafi by the TNC was a case of unconstitutional change 
of government since the situation involved the replacement of a recognised 
government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements (Koko and 
Bakwesegha-Osula 2012). Additionally, the recognition of the TNC by the AU 
amounted to an official endorsement of the AU’s own marginalisation by the 
deliberate acts of the UN and NATO’s coalition of the willing which actively but 
secretly supported the TNC.
The developments and divisions surrounding the Libyan conflict were, to 
some extent, quite reminiscent of what transpired in Madagascar in 2009 when 
Rajoelina ousted Ravalomanana in a coup. Although the AU PSC condemned 
the unconstitutional takeover of power in Madagascar, it was expected that all 
progressive and peace-loving African nations were going to take a common 
position on African conflicts. Interestingly, Gaddafi, during his tenure as 
chairman of the AU during that year, unaware that a similar fate was going to 
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befall his country a couple of years later, announced at that time that the Libyan 
government recognised the Rajoelina government, in stark contrast with the 
AU PSC position (The Economist [online] 2009). When similar developments 
happened in Libya in 2011, such disunity among African states worked to 
undermine AU efforts to attain a collective voice on an important peace and 
security matter which had befallen the African continent. 
Inaction on critical issues and ineffective resolutions
The lack of unity of purpose among African states has also resulted in the 
continental body failing to act decisively on critical issues. National sovereignty 
appears to take precedence ahead of the desires of the supranational organisation 
which in this case, is the AU. AU member states seem to have much national 
pride and they show signs of unity as a continent mainly at symbolic level. This 
has been more apparent whenever states feel that their ‘sovereignty’ has been 
threatened. Most Heads of State are still committed to the older rule of non-
interference. There has been an emphasis on the Westphalian notion of absolute 
sovereignty, coupled with a lack of the sense of collective action motivated 
by the need to achieve collective security. The result has been, among other 
issues, ambiguous provisions within the Constitutive Act and the focus on sub-
regionalism as opposed to regionalism/continentalism. This was quite evident 
in Libya where it became clear that there was no joint coordination in policy 
between the AU and the Arab League (Dubbelman 2012). Initially, the US was 
reportedly reluctant to intervene in Libya without the consent of the majority of 
Muslim nations. However, on the 12th of March 2011, the Council of the League 
of Arab States issued a statement calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone 
over Libya. This development showed that the Arab League was more aligned 
to NATO than the AU. This literally paved the way for the US to influence the 
UNSC, a development which eclipsed the AU’s mediation plans (Sturman 2012). 
NATO forces were later allowed to use the Arab League’s air space to launch 
attacks into Libya.
Generally, the continental body appears to focus more attention on creating 
situations free of direct physical violence (negative peace) through conflict 
management and resolution, which is more costly and difficult to achieve than 
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conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy which may bring about 
positive peace. The descent/collapse of many African countries into devastating 
armed conflict illustrates the consequences of perpetual inaction of the 
continental body. The inaction could be a possible reason why, in most instances, 
the peace missions that are deployed by the AU have restrictive mandates, that 
is, the missions are confined to observation instead of protection of the civilian 
population through the use of force when necessary. The AU, through the PSC, 
appears to have no teeth to enforce its resolutions and has become more of a 
spectator of the political squabbles rocking the African continent. 
The swiftness with which the conflict spiralled in Libya found the AU unprepared 
to tackle the crisis with corresponding speed. Unlike the demonstrations in 
Tunisia and Libya which were peaceful until the leaders surrendered power, the 
uprising in Libya turned violent within a week (Mbeki 2011b; Williams 2011). 
This reason, coupled with the lack of tact and innovation on the part of the 
AU, and the absence of precedents in dealing with seemingly new modalities 
of regime change, appear to have influenced the slow response and softly-
softly approach by the continental organisation towards the crisis in Libya. 
The AU’s response was rather lethargic. Initially, the AU PSC issued two very 
strong declarations supporting the legitimate aspirations for democracy by 
the people of Libya, condemning violence and the violation of international 
humanitarian law against civilians. Besides the pronouncements condemning 
the grave developments in Libya from the time the campaign against Gaddafi 
started (around mid-February 2011), the AU’s first effective and action-oriented 
response was almost a month later (on 10 March 2011) when the desire to 
seek to mediate through the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee was finalised. 
This development and the adoption of the roadmap were in synchronisation 
with the AU’s age-old and usual doctrine of dealing with intra-state conflict. 
This demonstrated the lack of innovation as the approach did not take into 
consideration the then rebels’ rapid switch from popular uprising into a de facto 
civil war (Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula 2012).
Some scholars argue that despite the interference in Libya by the Western powers 
whose use of excessive force undermined the African approach to African 
solutions, there were no prospects of success for the AU roadmap to peace right 
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from the beginning (Nathan 2011). This was an appropriate projection which was 
later vindicated. Indeed, there were misconceptions about the violent uprising, 
rebellions and the practice of mediation. Given the nature of rebellions and the 
fact that the Libyan uprising had just begun, chances of successfully mediating 
between the warring parties were highly likely to fail during the infancy stages 
because the mutually hurting stalemate was far from being anticipated (Nathan 
2011). The attempt by the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee to mediate and 
seek assurance of a ceasefire during the infancy of the crisis was premature and 
unrealistic. This was because of the fact that Gaddafi’s forces were escalating the 
bombings while the TNC was launching retaliatory attacks as well as rebuffing 
talks on AU terms (Sturman 2012). Given the TNC’s great frustration with 
Gaddafi’s perceived tyranny as well as with exclusion from governance, coupled 
with the inspiration from the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences which were 
recent by then, and the attendant determination to overthrow the incumbent 
regime, the AU roadmap was bound to be rejected (Nathan 2011). Interestingly, 
even if the proposed settlement was noble and acceptable, it was still doomed 
to fail because of skewed perceptions among the protagonists. The AU was not 
acceptable to the TNC as a credible, trusted, non-partisan and genuine mediator 
since it had consistently ignored the structural violence in Libya. The TNC also 
suspected that Gaddafi had accepted the roadmap to peace fully aware that the 
AU lacked the ‘hard power’ to enforce compliance in the event that the TNC 
had accepted the peace initiative. The TNC therefore suspected that Gaddafi was 
likely to make use of the AU proposal to bolster his position and possibly weaken 
the TNC. Coincidentally, the TNC’s rejection of the AU peace plan was actually 
in line with the stance that was taken by NATO’s coalition of the willing.
Importantly, African leaders have initiated and sustained over the years 
a conservatism buttressed by the notion/culture of peer-shielding that 
entails an unwillingness to criticise one another – especially on questionable 
governance issues. The principle and practice of African solidarity gradually 
became the reigning ideology on the continent. This has also been justified 
by obscure notions of ‘African solutions to African problems’ when conflict 
situations deteriorate. Many African leaders were shaken by the developments 
in North Africa and they also became vulnerable to volatile public sentiment. 
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Therefore, the attitude of other African Heads of State was quite cognisant of the 
risk of having the protests overflowing to their countries, and this underpinned 
the cracks which emerged among the African countries (Clarke 2012; Harsch 
2011). They could not openly condemn Gaddafi’s crackdown on the protesters 
because they were likely to adopt similar repressive tactics if the uprisings had 
spread to their countries.
Possible innovations to enhance the AU’s effectiveness
The AU, through the PSC, may have to take very bold steps to ensure the success 
of its efforts to maintain or in some instances restore peace and security on 
the continent. One of the first things that the AU could possibly do in order 
to realise some of the intended AU goals is to enhance the ability to act before 
conflicts escalate to become destructive. The system of governance which was in 
Libya before the uprising was not wholly informed by the tenets of conventional 
democracy and universal suffrage as practised in most of the modern democratic 
states. Gaddafi’s system of democracy was questionable given the fact that the 
country never had popular conventional elections for four decades (Martinez 
2007). If the AU had a clear mechanism to act on potentially volatile situations, 
the Libyan crisis could have been somehow averted. Given the existence of 
the continental early warning system, the arm of the AU PSC which facilitates 
timely and efficient detection of and response to conflict and crisis situations in 
Africa (AU Compendium 2012), the Libyan crisis needed to be managed before 
getting out of hand. Chances are that the Continental Early Warning System 
might have been aware of the divisions, grumbling and discontent among the 
Libyans over Gaddafi’s leadership and style of governance. Ideally, preventive 
action could have been instituted before the situation turned violent as it did. 
Even when the insurrection erupted, reports of the Gaddafi forces being heavy 
handed and committing mass atrocities against the protesters could have been 
timeously detected and attended to with the speed that it deserved. The visibility 
of the AU’s mechanism to react timeously to conflict situations appears to be 
the missing link which needs improvement, lest the continental early warning 
mechanism be viewed as ineffective.
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There is need for a paradigm shift among African countries especially on the 
role of the PSC as a continental mechanism and the co-operation that should 
take place between the PSC and sub-regional mechanisms. The stance which was 
taken by the Arab League to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone undermined 
the AU. A trend of benign neglect and the absence of a shared strategic vision 
are quite evident across Africa. A shared strategic vision can only be achieved if 
African countries were to reflect and address some of the fundamental issues 
which underlie the AU’s failures in maintaining peace and security across the 
continent. The need for integration and collective security undergird some of the 
AU’s aspirations. For integration and collective security to be achieved among 
African countries, there is need for partial surrender of sovereignty to the AU. 
The tendency by states to value national interests ahead of collective security, 
a tendency which is anchored in the celebration of national sovereignty above 
continental sovereignty, needs to be altered. The partial surrender of sovereignty 
does not mean the forfeiting of the right to manage a particular territory, but 
entails the promotion of collective security through a supranational structure 
which, in this case, is the AU. If this was observed in Libya, then the continent 
could have rallied behind a common position and the situation could have 
turned out differently.
These recommendations might gradually be achieved if African countries heed 
the call to unity that has always been stressed and was the underlying cause for 
the formation of the OAU in 1963 and the subsequent transformation which 
gave birth to the AU. Unity will enable member states to realise the utility of 
working within the framework of the AU and PSC in maintaining peace and 
security across the continent. Collective continental unity and political will can 
go a long way in assisting the AU PSC’s ambition to rid the continent of conflicts 
which have frequently been erupting across the African continent despite the 
creation of the AU, which is a rebranded and supposedly re-invigorated version 
of the OAU. It will also enhance collective action in conflict situations and ensure 
that the continent attains a collective voice, especially on peace and security 
issues affecting Africa. The developments in Libya clearly show the neglect of the 
virtues of the envisaged unity and the consequential invasion of Libya typified 
the absence of unity.
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The AU should evoke the notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in 
circumstances where a government launches indiscriminate assaults on the 
very people that it ought to protect. Intervening in grave circumstances would 
be in line with the provisions of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act which 
envisages that the continental organisation will have the right to intervene in 
member states in the event of grave circumstances like crimes against humanity 
(Gebrewold 2010). Although some NATO countries stretched and abused the 
concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in order to disguise the regime change 
agenda in Libya while undermining the AU, the intervention also exposed the 
AU’s political unwillingness to implement Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act 
(Kuwali 2012).
The need for the AU to be progressive, innovative and adaptive to changing 
situations remains imperative. The fact that the uprising in Libya was slightly 
different from the usual military coups called for tactical innovation in dealing 
with the crisis. There was need to recognise that North Africa is an exceptional 
sub-region of Africa which overlaps with the Arab and Mediterranean realms. 
Therefore, the AU could not so easily play a leading role on its own in Libya given 
the attendant threat and security implications of the wider context of the Arab 
Spring to Southern Europe (Sturman 2012). Taking note of the implications 
and limitations of ‘African solutions to African problems’ for such countries 
which are not in Sub-Saharan Africa, and considering the wider context of such 
conflicts would greatly help the AU in future. 
Conclusion
The AU in general and the PSC in particular have a huge mandate and a lot of 
potential to manage and transform conflicts besetting the African continent. To 
ignore the conflict phenomena that the AU promised to eradicate would be a 
negation of its core and founding principles as enunciated in the AU Constitutive 
Act. Whereas armed conflicts have become the most serious threat to its 
vision, the AU has to demonstrate its new stance of non-indifference through 
military interventions where necessary. However, to date, the AU’s performance 
has been very modest. Normative preferences regarding sovereignty, non-
interference and non-intervention remain very contentious issues within 
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the AU. Armed insurrection, as happened in Libya, is therefore testing the 
AU intervention capacity amid indications of a tendency to steer clear of the 
military option even where the need is overarching. Additionally, the AU has 
not been as effective as expected since the institution lacks teeth to enforce its 
resolutions. The institutional limitations, ineffectiveness, disunity and lethargic 
approaches to critical issues were all exposed during the 2011 Libyan crisis. As 
the Libyan conflict unfolded, the AU members simply tried to find a way to 
restore their reputations and gain a larger share of the new African diplomatic 
order, one where Libya’s role was going to be diminished notwithstanding the 
outcome of the war. Despite registering some successes on a number of other 
fronts, the AU may take a little longer to have a solid/united and effective 
continental mechanism to decisively deal with the conflicts besetting the African 
continent. Inadvertently, the quest for unity in Africa is at times hindered by 
some external forces that blatantly disrespect the idea of ‘African solutions to 
African problems’. Additionally, the AU’s inability to arrive at common positions 
during upheavals continues to undermine its effort and noble intentions as 
evidenced by the Libyan crisis. However, instead of moaning about the perceived 
imperialist pretentions of some Western powers to divide and possibly rule/
control Africa in furtherance of their interests, a more sustainable approach for 
AU leaders would be to see to it that local grievances are effectively addressed 
before conflicts become pronounced. While there are limitations to the AU’s 
fledgling institutions and mechanisms developed to manage conflicts across the 
continent, the AU and especially the PSC may still need to be given more time 
to evolve and work effectively, notwithstanding the fact that it is now more than 
one decade after the transition from OAU to AU.
Despite the AU’s failure to precisely distinguish between benign neglect and 
malign involvement in the Libyan uprising, the fact remains that the AU 
member states lack political will and unity, as well as a broader diplomatic 
strategy to tackle continental challenges to peace and security. For the AU to 
forge a common strategic peace and security culture which will deal decisively 
with armed conflicts across the continent, it may require a majority conception 
and some enduring, far-reaching changes that might be difficult to achieve 
within the foreseeable future as long as present conditions persist. While it is an 
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apt time to reflect on whether the old rules still undergird the AU intervention 
strategy, it remains overarching that African leaders must stand together to erase 
the contagion of the 2011 Libyan experience and move forward to ensure a solid 
strategic capacity of the AU so that they, as leaders, become the midwives of the 
envisaged Africa destiny.
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